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LOCAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT OF
IMMIGRATION LAW: AN EQUAL
PROTECTION ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
Effective immigration enforcement has been an elusive goal in the
United States. Numerous techniques have been employed to achieve
an effective enforcement strategy. Some initiatives have focused on
increasing control over the border.' Congress's efforts include
criminalizing the harboring and smuggling of illegal aliens and sanc-
tioning employers who hire the undocumented.2 In addition, legisla-
tive measures adopted in 1929 and 1986 have attempted to address the
problem by legalizing the long-term undocumented population al-
ready present in the United States. 3 For example, in the 1986 am-
nesty, individuals received legalized status based on employment in
certain industries and on time spent working in the United States. 4
Although 2.8 million individuals legalized their status through the
1986 Immigration and Reform Control Act,5 the population of indi-
viduals in the United States without legal status remains high.6 Esti-
mates vary from eight million to ten million.7
Long-time concern over the number of undocumented immigrants
has escalated following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The
Bush administration reorganized the enforcement wing of the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service, creating the Bureau of Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement under the Department of Homeland
Security.8 The Administration initiated new measures to track indi-
1. Thomas J. Espenshade, Unauthorized Immigration to the United States, 21 ANN. REV. OF
Soc. 195, 211-12 (1995).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 211.
4. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1160, 1187, 1188, 1255a,
1324a, 1324b, 1364, 1365 (2000).
5. Espenshade, supra note 1, at 200.
6. See State and Local Authority to Enforce Immigration Law: Evaluating a Unified Approach
r 0t-nL T ists .1;.g &-forthero ,Su c. .. " Immigration, Border Securiiy and Citi-
zenship of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 5 (Apr. 22, 2004) [hereinafter HSEA
Hearing] (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions, Member, Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security
and Citizenship), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1156.
7. Id.
8. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002); Exec. Order
No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,812 (Oct. 8, 2001).
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viduals once they enter the country.9 The number of agents patrolling
the border has increased substantially.' 0 Yet this has not made a dent
in the huge undocumented population. Consequently, the Clear Law
Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act (CLEAR Act)1 and
its House counterpart, the Homeland Security Enhancement Act
(HSEA),1 2 grew out of the increasing frustration of both the govern-
ment and the public with the inability of enforcement action to control
the presence of millions of undocumented immigrants. These bills
would empower and strongly encourage states to have state and local
law enforcement officers enforce civil immigration law. The theory
behind these proposals is that by increasing the number of enforce-
ment agents in the field, the efficiency of enforcement action will also
increase.
Enforcement efficiency, however, cannot be considered in a vac-
uum. The Supreme Court has held that equal protection applies to
those individuals present in the United States without permission.' 3
By deputizing local and state officers to enforce federal immigration
law, the CLEAR Act creates conflicting goals for local police officers.
Police officers have the duty to provide protection equally to all re-
sidents in their locality. 14 But, under the CLEAR Act, they must also
enforce immigration law whenever they encounter someone that they
have probable cause to believe is present in the United States without
authorization.' 5 Police officers will have to navigate between these
conflicting mandates when an undocumented immigrant is in need of
essential police services. Under a scheme of local enforcement of im-
migration law, undocumented immigrants would risk deportation in
every encounter with the police. Because of this incredible risk, whole
communities would avoid interactions with the police. 16 As a result,
the individuals in those communities would have limited access to po-
9. See John Ashcroft, United States Attorney General, Prepared Remarks on the National
Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) (June 6, 2002), available at http://www.us-
doj.gov/archive/aglspeeches/2002/O60502agpreparedremarks.htm. See infra notes 37-45 and ac-
companying text for a full discussion of NSEERS.
10. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Fact Sheet: U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Actions Taken Since 9/11 (Sept. 17, 2004), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact-sheets/
2004/09172004.xml.
11. Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act of 2005, H.R. 3137, 109th Cong.
(2005) [hereinafter CLEAR Act].
12. Homeland Security Enhancement Act of 2005, S. 1362, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter
HSEA]. Senator Jeff Sessions introduced the HSEA on June 30, 2005, but the HSEA has only
three co-sponsors.
13. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
14. See infra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 110-118 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 129-147 and accompanying text.
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lice protection, despite the constitutional guarantee of equal protec-
tion under the law. 17 In addition, the reduced amount of contact with
local residents would limit the efficiency of police services because of
a lack of community cooperation, resulting in more dangerous
neighborhoods. 18
Part II of this Comment looks at the traditional separation of duties
between local and state officials and federal immigration officials and
the current trend of relying on local and state enforcement as a solu-
tion to remedy ineffective enforcement. 19 Part II also details equal
protection case law that applies to aliens and the degree of scrutiny
applied by the courts.20 The equal protection analysis of denials or
failures to provide police protection will be addressed.21 Part III ana-
lyzes the CLEAR Act, and the resulting state policies of enforcement,
under an equal protection framework.22 Finally, Part IV addresses the
far-reaching impact this shift to local enforcement will have on our
communities and on our security and concludes that local enforce-
ment of civil immigration law is not only unconstitutional, but has nu-
merous negative policy implications. 23
II. BACKGROUND
To provide context for the discussion of the CLEAR Act, this sec-
tion will discuss the distinction between civil and criminal immigration
law and the traditional position that local authorities only have au-
thority to enforce criminal law.24 It will discuss recent changes in im-
migration enforcement, including numerous movements toward
expanding the role of local authorities. 25 This section will present an
overview of equal protection case law that analyzes laws that discrimi-
nate based on alienage.26 Finally, this section will consider the consti-
tutional protection provided against a denial of police protection. 27
17. See infra notes 129-147 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 210-214 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 28-60 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 6!-99 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 110-190 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 197-238 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 37-60 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 61-99 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
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A. Recent History of Immigration Enforcement
Prior to any discussion on the enforcement of immigration law, it is
important to first distinguish between the types of immigration viola-
tions. Immigration violations are divided into civil and criminal viola-
tions.28 Being present in the United States without authorization is a
civil violation. 29 Criminal violations include crossing the border with-
out inspection and trafficking immigrants. 30 This distinction between
criminal and civil violations has long been determinative of the appro-
priate authority to take enforcement action.
The traditional position regarding the enforcement authority of lo-
cal and state police limited the scope of their authority to criminal
immigration law.31 In Gonzalez v. City of Peoria,32 a group of citizens
brought suit alleging a violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights after local police stopped them to inquire into
their immigration status.33 The court recognized the authority of the
local police to enforce any criminal immigration violation but found
that their authority did not extend to arrests for civil immigration
violations. 34
This distinction separating the authority of local officers from fed-
eral officials was reiterated in a February 5, 1996 memorandum from
the Department of Justice Office of Legal Council entitled "Assis-
tance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens."' 35 In
28. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
29. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229-1229a (2000).
30. Id. § 1253 (failing to depart pursuant to a final order of removal); id. § 1306 (criminalizing
willful failure to register, failure to notify authorities of a change of address, making fraudulent
statements, counterfeiting documentation); id. § 1324 ("[blringing in and harboring certain
aliens"); id. § 1325(c)-(d) (prohibiting marriage or immigration entrepreneurship fraud); id.
§ 1326 ("reentry of removed aliens"); 8 U.S.C. § 1327 ("aiding or assisting certain aliens to
enter"); id. § 1328 ("importation of alien for immoral purpose").
31. Congress has explicitly granted local police the authority to engage in certain immigration
enforcement actions: Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L.
No. 104-132, § 439, 110 Stat. 1276 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252c, § 1324);
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357; Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10). See also Michael J.
Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084,
1092-95 (2003); Jill Keblawi, Comment, Immigration Arrests by Local Police: Inherent Authority
or Inherently Preempted?, 53 CATH. U. L. REv. 817, 819-24 (2003).
32. Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 476 ("We therefore conclude that state law authorizes Peoria police to enforce the
criminal provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. We firmly emphasize, however,
that this authorization is limited to criminal violations.").
35. Memorandum from Teresa Wynn Rosenborough, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens
(Feb. 5, 1996), available at www.usdoj.gov/olc/immstopola.htm.
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this memo, the Department, in keeping with precedent, stated, "State
and local police lack recognized legal authority to stop and detain an
alien solely on suspicion of civil deportability .... "36
An intention to move away from the traditional distinctive and sep-
arate roles of state and local police became apparent in 2002. In the
aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks, the Department of Justice be-
gan to focus on reforming the immigration system.37 One of these
reforms was a new registration system, the National Security Entry-
Exit Registration System (NSEERS), which was designed to track all
noncitizens entering and exiting the country.38 Attorney General
John Ashcroft introduced NSEERS on June 6, 2002.3 9 Individuals
who do not comply with NSEERS are entered in the National Crime
Information Center (NCIC) system, a system checked by police of-
ficers "regularly in the course of traffic stops and routine en-
counters. ' 40 If an individual's name appears in the NCIC system, the
police officer will arrest the individual and transfer him or her to im-
migration officials. 41 Although former Attorney General Ashcroft
described the mission of local law enforcement as "arresting aliens
who have violated criminal provisions of Immigration and Nationality
Act or civil provisions that render an alien deportable, and who are
listing on the NCIC," he also noted that this mission was voluntary
and requested that local authorities accept this mission.42 The Attor-
ney General's remarks failed to clarify the extent to which local au-
thorities would be engaged in immigration enforcement by referring
to the arrest of aliens who have violated "civil provisions that render
an alien deportable" while stating "[t]he Department of Justice has no
plans to seek additional support from state and local law enforcement
in enforcing our nation's immigration laws, beyond our narrow anti-
terrorism mission. '43 In response to concerns regarding the lack of
clarity, Alberto Gonzales, then White House Counsel (and current
36. Id.
37. See generally Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of
the Post-September llth "Pale of Law," 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 639, 640 (2003).
38. See Ashcroft, supra note 9. NSEERS would require the fingerprinting and photographing
of those entering at the border. Id. Aliens would be required to register periodically if they stay
in the. United States for more than thirty days. Id. Finally, NSEERS would establish exit con-
trols, so officials will know whether an individual is complying with the terms of his or her visa.
Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. But see Wishnie, supra note 31, at 1095-1101, for an argument that this is an illegal use
of the NCIC because it is not included in the statutorily authorized uses of the NCIC system.
41. Ashcroft, supra note 9.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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Attorney General), wrote a letter clarifying that "[o]nly high-risk
aliens who fit a terrorist profile will be placed in NCIC. '44 The Gon-
zales letter suggests that the current policy continues to limit local au-
thorities to immigration enforcement in connection with aliens
engaged in or with the propensity to commit criminal activity.45
Following this announcement, Florida entered into a Memorandum
of Understanding with the Department of Justice, agreeing to enforce
immigration law in connection with terrorism.46 Other localities re-
sponded even more warmly to the Attorney General's invitation for
local enforcement. The police in Northampton, Pennsylvania, and
Washington County, Utah, currently both investigate and arrest peo-
ple for immigration violations. 47
This broadening of the scope of local and state police power was
reflected in a 1999 Tenth Circuit decision. In United States v. Vasquez-
Alvarez, 48 the court held that local police did have the authority to
enforce immigration law broadly.49 The court found that 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252, which authorizes local police to arrest illegal aliens with crimi-
nal backgrounds, 50 provided an additional ground for police action,
but in no way restricted the local police's authority to enforce federal
law, including civil immigration law.51
Although the interest in local enforcement of immigration law has
increased, it still raises several legal questions. One major barrier to
local enforcement of immigration law is the federal plenary power
44. Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to Demetrios G. Papademe-
triou, Migration Policy Institute (June 24, 2002), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/files/
whitehouse.pdf.
45. Id.; see Keblawi, supra note 31, at 839.
46. Keblawi, supra note 31, at 840.
47. Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local
Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 970
(2004).
48. United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 1999).
49. Id. at 1295.
50. Section 1252c(a) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, to the extent permitted by relevant State
and local law, State and local law enforcement officials are authorized to arrest and
detain an individual who-
(1) is an alien illegally present in the United States; and
(2) has previously been convicted of a felony in the United States and deported or
left the United States after such conviction,
but only after the State or local law enforcement Officials obtain appropriate confir-
mation from the [INS] of the status of such individual and only for such period of time
as may be required for the [INS] to take the individual into Federal custody for pur-
poses of deporting or removing the alien from the United States.
8 U.S.C. § 1252c(a) (2000).
51. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d at 1297.
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over immigration that preempts any action taken by local and state
authorities.52 To determine whether the action is preempted, courts
look to the intent of Congress. 53 In analyzing immigration statutes,
the courts have found that from the complexity of immigration law,
they can infer a congressional intent to preclude local authorities from
enforcing federal immigration law.54
The most recent and most complete movement toward local en-
forcement of immigration law removes even this barrier. The
CLEAR Act was introduced on June 30, 2005 by Representative
Charlie Norwood of Georgia.55 Currently, it has ninety-seven co-
sponsors.56 The CLEAR Act denies states or cities federal funding
under § 241(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act if they have a
"statute, policy, or practice that prohibits law enforcement officers of
the State ... from assisting or cooperating with Federal immigration
law enforcement in the course of carrying out the officers' routine law
enforcement duties ... .-57 Because the CLEAR Act makes abso-
lutely plain the congressional intent regarding local enforcement of
52. Karl Manheim, State Immigration Laws and Federal Supremacy, 22 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 939, 958-60 (1995); see also Keblawi, supra note 31, at 819-24.
53. See, e.g., Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing DeCanas v.
Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976)) (noting that "[t]o conclude [that] preclusion [of local enforce-
ment] was the legislative intent, we would have to find that 'complete ouster of state power...
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress"') (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. The court found that:
an intent to preclude local enforcement may be inferred where the system of federal
regulation is so pervasive that no opportunity for state activity remains. We assume that
the civil provisions of the Act regulating authorized entry, length of stay, residence
status, and deportation, constitute such a pervasive regulatory scheme, as would be
consistent with the exclusive federal power over immigration.
Id. at 474-75 (internal citations omitted).
In addition, the view that Congress intends to preempt local enforcement finds additional
support in the legislative history, which specifically authorizes local enforcement of specific im-
migration violations. Wishnie, supra note 31, at 1092-94.
55. CLEAR Act, H.R. 3137, 109th Cong. (2005).
56. CLEAR Act Bill Summary and Status, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl09:h.r.
03137: (last visited Feb. 23, 2006).
57. H.R. 3137 § 3(a). The HSEA takes a different approach, making any "statute, policy, or
practice that prohibits a law enforcement officer of a State ... from enforcing Federal immigra-
tion laws . .. [a] violation of section 642(a) of the illegal immigration Reform and immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 [IIRAIRA] ... and section 434 of the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 [PRWORA] . 5..." S  1362, 109th Cong. § 4(a)
(2005) (internal citation omitted). Section 642(a) of IIRAIRA and § 434 of PRWORA prohibit
any restrictions on a state or local entity that would prevent the entity from "sending to, or
receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding ... immigra-
tion status .... 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2000). The 2003 versions of the CLEAR Act and the
HSEA were virtually identical, denying states funds under § 241(i) to any state that failed to
affirmatively enact a law authorizing their state and local police to enforce federal immigration
law. CLEAR Act, H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. (2003); HSEA, S. 1906 (2003).
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federal immigration law, the concern regarding preemption is no
longer relevant. 58 Additionally, the CLEAR Act criminalizes pres-
ence in the United States without authorization, which historically has
been a civil violation.59 This change would moot any argument re-
garding the distinction between criminal and civil violations because
all immigration violations would be criminal.60 Because the CLEAR
Act effectively eliminates all prior barriers to local enforcement of
immigration law, the next question is whether the local enforcement
that the CLEAR Act and the HSEA require is constitutional.
B. Equal Protection and Aliens
The protection of the Fourteenth Amendment has long been inter-
preted broadly to cover all persons in the United States. 61 As early as
1886, courts have affirmed that resident aliens also enjoy equal protec-
tion under the laws.62 In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the U.S. Supreme
Court considered a California law that required owners of laundries in
certain types of buildings to apply for permits in order to operate.63
But officials enforcing this law regularly denied permits requested by
Chinese individuals, while granting requests by non-Chinese individu-
als.64 Thus, the court struck down the permit system, which it found
to be discriminatory in practice towards Chinese applicants based on
the constitutional requirement that no person be denied equal protec-
tion under the laws.65 Despite the Supreme Court's early protection
of individuals from alienage discrimination, the Court deferred greatly
to the states on subsequent alienage classifications as long as the states
could show that the classification was related to special public interest
58. Kanstroom, supra note 37, at 657.
59. H.R. 3137 § 4(a). The CLEAR Act makes unlawful presence a felony. Id. The HSEA
also criminalizes unlawful presence, making it a misdemeanor. S. 1362 § 5(a).
60. Kanstroom, supra note 37, at 657.
61. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
62. Id. at 368-69.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 374. The opinion does not refer to the status of these individuals as legal or illegal,
presumably because it was not until the 1880s that restrictions of any sort were placed on
immigrants.
65. The Court described the equal protection rights of aliens, stating:
The fourteenth amendment to the constitution is not confined to the protection of citi-
zens. It says: "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." These provisions are universal in their application, to all per-
sons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of
color, or of nationality.
Id. at 369.
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and did not intrude on the federal power over immigration by directly
regulating immigration.66
The Supreme Court reversed its deference in Takahashi v. Fish and
Game Commission.67 California had prohibited the issuance of fish-
ing licenses to anyone ineligible to become a United States citizen
under the rationale that it was conserving its resources for use by its
citizens.68 Under federal law at the time, Japanese and other non-
white racial groups were ineligible for citizenship. The Supreme
Court rejected this rationale as insufficient to justify a classification
based on alienage and held that the law violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.69
The Supreme Court eventually adopted the demanding standard of
strict scrutiny for any legislation that classified on the basis of alien-
age.70 In Graham v. Richardson,71 the Court used strict scrutiny to
66. Manheim, supra note 52, at 965-67.
67. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
68. Id. at 413-14.
69. The Court held that
To whatever extent the fish in the three-mile belt off California may be "capable of
ownership" by California, we think that "ownership" is inadequate to justify California
in excluding any or all aliens who are lawful residents of the State from making a living
by fishing in the ocean off its shores while permitting all others to do so.
Id. at 421.
70. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). The Supreme Court has adopted a three
tiered equal protection framework in which the level of scrutiny is based on the type of classifi-
cation made by the law. Strict scrutiny requires the government to show that the classification is
narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. Classifications based on race or national
origin (with some exceptions, see infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text) merit strict scrutiny.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); see also Graham, 403 U.S. at 372. Rarely
will a law be upheld after strict scrutiny is applied. Intermediate scrutiny requires that the classi-
fication be substantially related to an important government interest. Classifications based on
gender and status as an illegitimate child are evaluated under intermediate scrutiny. Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). Rational basis
review is the third tier. If the law does not classify on a basis that merits strict or intermediate
scrutiny, rational basis review applies. To pass rational basis review, the law must simply be
rationally related to a legitimate government interest. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425
(1961). Rarely will a law fail under this standard. The Supreme Court has been moving toward
what some have been calling rational basis review with bite. This is a more searching review of
laws that would generally receive only rational basis review. Using this heightened standard, the
Supreme Court has overturned laws where there appenrs to be no other purpose other than bare
animus. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that a voter initiative revoking pro-
tection from discrimination based on homosexuality and preventing any future protective mea-
sures from being enacted violated equal protection); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (holding that the city ordinance requiring a special permit for
group homes for the mentally disabled violated equal protection because it was based on irra-
tional prejudice). The Court has also applied a tougher version of rational basis to irrational
administrative decisions. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Country Comm'n, 488 U.S 336, 343
(1989) (holding that a practice of the county tax assessor that involved valuing property at fifty
percent of its last sale price violated equal protection because the taxes an individual paid varied
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strike down an Arizona law that made noncitizens ineligible for disa-
bility benefits unless they had been a resident of the United States for
fifteen years. 72 The Court adopted the strict scrutiny standard to pro-
tect aliens who the Court deemed a discrete and insular minority. 73
Again, the Court found that the justification of preserving benefits for
citizens to be insufficient to satisfy the compelling government interest
standard. 74 A series of cases followed Graham v. Richardson, with the
Court striking down laws that denied aliens certain jobs, licenses, or
financial aid for education. 75 But the Court did recognize a political
process exception. 76 The Court ruled that a law need only meet the
rational basis test if the statute excludes an alien from a position that
involves the formulation of public policy. 77 These positions included
police officers, teachers, and probation officers.78
The Supreme Court has dealt directly with the equal protection
rights of undocumented immigrants only in Plyler v. Doe, 79 in which
undocumented children challenged a Texas law that denied them ac-
cess to the public education system.8 0 The Court specifically held that
the Equal Protection Clause protects illegal aliens, but that illegal
aliens are not a suspect class because their status is the result of volun-
tary action. 8' In reaching its decision, the Court focused on the im-
greatly depending of when it was last sold). See infra note 84 for Manheim's argument that the
Court applied "rational basis with a bite" in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
71. Graham, 403 U.S. at 365.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 372 ("[C]lassifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are
inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime example of
a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.").
74. Id. at 374-75.
75. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 12 (1977) (holding that a New York law limiting state
financial aid for higher education to citizens, those who intended to become citizens, and refu-
gees was a violation of equal protection); Examining Bd. of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors
v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 603-06 (1976) (striking down Puerto Rico statute denying
noncitizens engineering licenses as a violation of equal protection); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634, 642-43 (1973) (finding a New York law preventing noncitizens from holding certain
state civil service positions a violation of equal protection): In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 727-29
(1973) (holding that a Connecticut court rule denying admission to the state bar to noncitizens
was a violation of equal protection).
76. Manheim, supra note 52, at 1011.
77. Id.
78. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (probation officers); Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68 (1979) (teachers); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (state police officers). But
see Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 226-28 (1984) (holding that notary publics do not fit within
this exception, and therefore it is a Fourteenth Amendment violation to exclude aliens from
holding the position of a notary public). See also infra note 84 and accompanytext for Man-
heim's critique of the exception to strict scrutiny.
79. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
80. Id.
81. The Court explained its classification of illegal aliens, stating:
1112
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portance of education and the children's lack of responsibility for
their immigration status. 82 Because of these two factors, the Court
required a substantial governmental interest to justify the denial of
public education to undocumented children. 83 The Court did not rec-
ognize education as a fundamental right, but it did allow the impor-
tance of education to influence the degree of scrutiny it applied.84
Since the Supreme Court's 1982 ruling in Plyler v. Doe, there have
been few cases involving equal protection claims by undocumented
immigrants. The claims that have been brought have been wholly un-
successful. A few years after Plyler, a California appellate court de-
cided an equal protection case involving the denial of access to a drug
treatment program to an undocumented immigrant because he lacked
valid immigrant or nonimmigrant status.85 The court did not reach the
equal protection question; after a discussion of Plyler, however, it did
note that "[i]t is questionable .. .whether strict scrutiny would be
applied in this case even if the patient-inmates were rejected solely
because of their illegal alien status. '8 6 Additionally, in 1993, Alaska's
Supreme Court, applying rational basis review, found that a denial of
Permanent Fund dividends8 7 to illegal aliens was not an equal protec-
tion violation because the plaintiffs were adults responsible for their
status, and a denial of a dividend has none of the stigmatization of a
We reject the claim that "illegal aliens" are a "suspect class." No case in which we have
attempted to define a suspect class.., has addressed the status of persons unlawfully in
our country. Unlike most of the classifications that we have recognized as suspect,
entry into this class, by virtue of entry into this country, is the product of voluntary
action. Indeed, entry into the class is itself a crime. In addition, it could hardly be
suggested that undocumented status is a "constitutional irrelevancy."
Id. at 219 n.19 (internal citations omittted).
82. Id. at 223-24 (noting that "[in determining the rationality of § 21.031, we may appropri-
ately take into account its costs to the Nation and to the innocent children who are its victims").
83. Id. at 230 ("If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the free public
education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that denial must be justified
by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest.").
84. Some have described this approach as intermediate scrutiny. Dep't of Revenue v. Cosio,
858 P.2d 621, 626-27 (Alaska 1993). Professor Manheim, on the other hand, calls this new stan-
dard of review "rational basis with bite." Manheim, supra note 52, at 1011. Manheim argues
that this is not the only case where the interests involved affect the level of scrutiny. He notes
that "where the discrininationi relates to jobs implicating the state's sovereign identity, e.g., pub-
lic officials and school teachers, rather than its pecuniary interest in the public fisc or it parens
patriae interest in the general welfare, the degree of scrutiny drops precipitously to rational
basis." Id.
85. People v. Arciga, 227 Cal. Rptr. 611 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
86. Id. at 618.
87. Cosio, 858 P.2d at 623. The court noted that eligibility for Permanent Fund dividends is
determined by statute, stating, "Under AS 43 .23.005(a)(1) a 'state resident' is entitled to receive
a permanent fund dividend. Alaska Statute 43.23.095(8) defines 'state resident' as 'an individual
who is physically present in the state with the intent to remain permanently in the state ....' Id.
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denial of basic education. 88 Finally, a district court in Georgia re-
cently decided a case challenging the denial of driver's licenses to ille-
gal aliens. 89 The court applied rational basis review and found that
there was a legitimate governmental interest in denying illegal aliens
driver's licenses.90
Although courts in the above cases analyzed state laws that discrim-
inated against undocumented immigrants under rational basis review,
state laws that discriminate based on alienage are subject to strict
scrutiny.91 Courts subject federal laws, however, to a much less exact-
ing standard. Because the federal government has plenary power over
immigration, 92 federal regulations enjoy great deference and must
withstand only rational basis review.93 State regulations, however, en-
joy no such deference. 94 In Matthews v. Diaz,95 a federal law restrict-
ing Medicare eligibility to citizens and legal permanent residents with
five years of residence was upheld because is was not "wholly irra-
tional. '96 But a similar state law was struck down in Graham v. Rich-
ardson as a violation of equal protection. 97 Thus, classifications based
on alienage must survive strict scrutiny,9 while classifications based
on undocumented status receive an ambiguous, though lesser degree
of scrutiny.99
C. Constitutional Protection for Denials of Police Protection
If Congress enacts the CLEAR Act or the HSEA, the result would
be an effective denial of police protection to undocumented immi-
grants. By contacting the police, an undocumented immigrant would
risk arrest and deportation. Because of this, there is a de facto denial
88. Id. at 629.
89. Doe v. Georgia Dep't of Public Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
90. Id. at 1376. Although several states have authorized the issuance of driver's licenses to
undocumented immigrants, the Real ID Act was enacted on May 11, 2005 as part of the Emer-
gency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami
Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005). This law prohibits any federal agency from
accepting a driver's license from a state that does not meet the requirements of the Act, begin-
ning three years from the date of enactment. The Act forbids licenses from being issued to
anyone who does not have legal status. Id.
91. Manheim, supra note 52, at 1011.
92. Keblawi, supra note 31, at 819-24.
93. Manheim, supra note 52, at 1011.
94. Id.
95. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
96. Id. at 83.
97. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
98. Manheim, supra note 52, at 1011; see also Graham, 403 U.S. 365.
99. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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of police services.100 A fundamental right to police protection has
never been recognized. 10' The Supreme Court found in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services 02 that the state had no
liability when its local officials knew that a child was being abused by
his father but failed to intervene, resulting in continued abuse that left
the child profoundly retarded.103 The Court held that states have no
obligation to protect their citizens' lives, liberty, or property, 104 but
once it undertakes the provision of such services, "The State may not,
of course, selectively deny its protective services to certain disfavored
minorities without violating the Equal Protection Clause.' ' 05
III. ANALYSIS
When looked at through an equal protection lens, the local enforce-
ment of federal immigration law raises considerable constitutional
questions. This section compares the level of deference accorded to
federal laws that discriminate on the basis of alienage with state laws
that discriminate on the same basis.106 Next, it considers the discrimi-
natory impact of police enforcement of federal immigration law.10 7
100. See Theodore W. Maya, Comment, To Serve and Protect or to Betray and Neglect?: The
LAPD and Undocumented Immigrants, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1611 (2001-2002), for a similar analy-
sis regarding the effect of a repeal of Special Order 40 in Los Angeles.
101. Attorney Lawrence Rosenthal argues that the right to police protection should be re-
garded as fundamental. He notes:
Under the Equal Protection Clause, accordingly, the government is obligated to pro-
vide effectively equal protection against all threats to public peace and safety .... [I]t
would even be appropriate to characterize the right to protection against lawbreakers
as "fundamental"; it is expressly protected by the Constitution, and under the case law,
when a right that enjoys express or implicit constitutional protection is at issue, strict
judicial scrutiny is ordinarily required.
Lawrence Rosenthal, Policing and Equal Protection, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 53, 73 (2003).
102. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
103. Id. at 192-93.
104. Id. at 197. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this position recently in Town of Castle Rock
v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005), holding that the plaintiff had no "property interest in police
enforcement of her restraining order" where police failed to respond to her notification that her
husband had taken their children in violation of a restraining order, resulting in the murder of
her three children. Id. at 2810.
105. DeShaney, 487 U.S. at 197 n.3. For example, an equal protection claim for a denial of
police protection was brought in Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056 (!st Cir 1997), where police failed
to protect a domestic violence victim. The court held that in order to succeed on her claim the
plaintiff "must show that there is a policy or custom of [the police] providing less protection to
victims of domestic violence than to other victims of crimes, that gender discrimination is a
motivating factor, and that [the plaintiff] was injured by the" policy or custom. Id. at 1066. In
that case, the plaintiff did not succeed in her claim because she failed to prove a policy of provid-
ing less protection, even though the police officer informed her abuser of the complaint, result-
ing in the murder of the plaintiff's two children. Id. at 1072.
106. See infra notes 110-128 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 129-147 and accompanying text.
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This section also considers the appropriate level of scrutiny for state
policies that permit such enforcement under the equal protection
framework. 108 Finally, this section analyzes the importance of the
state interests that justify these new policies authorizing local officials
to enforce immigration law, concluding that because the state interests
may not be compelling enough to justify the decline in access to police
services, these laws would stand on a shaky constitutional footing. 10 9
A. Lack of Deference to State Policies Required by
the CLEAR Act and HSEA
In determining the constitutionality of the CLEAR Act and the
HSEA under the Equal Protection Clause, the nature of the legisla-
tion itself must first be considered. Both bills authorize state or local
law enforcement personnel to "investigate, identify, apprehend, ar-
rest, detain, or transfer to Federal custody aliens in the United States
... for the purposes of assisting in the enforcement of the immigration
laws of the United States in the course of carrying out routine du-
ties."'1 0 The CLEAR Act and the HSEA also make unlawful pres-
ence a criminal violation."' The HSEA increases criminal penalties
108. See infra notes 148-174 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 175-190 and accompanying text.
110. CLEAR Act, H.R. 3137, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005). The HSEA provision is virtually identi-
cal. See HSEA, S. 1362, 109th Cong. §3 (2005).
111. H.R. 3137 § 3(a); S. 1362 § 4(a). The CLEAR Act's definition of illegal alien includes:
[An alien who-
(A) is apprehended while entering (or attempting to enter) the United States at a
time or place other than as designated by immigration officers;
(B) enters the United States without inspection;
(C) fails to depart the United States within 30 days after the expiration date of a
nonimmigrant visa or a voluntary departure agreement and is not in other lawful status;
or
(D) fails to depart the United States within 30 days after the date of a final order of
removal and is not in other lawful status.
H.R. 3137 § 4(c)(3). The HSEA's definition is somewhat different. The HSEA also includes an
individual who was "admitted as a nonimmigrant and who ... had failed to-(A) maintain the
nonimmigrant status in which the alien was admitted ... or (B) comply with the conditions of
any such status" and immigrants who have "subsequently failed to comply with the requirements
of that status." S. 1362 § 8(e). The HSEA does not provide the thirty-day window for departure
that the CLEAR Act provides. Both the HSEA and the CLEAR Act provide an affirmative
defense to unlawful presence if the individual can show that he or she "overstayed the time
allotted under a visa due to an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship or physical illness
that prevented the alien from leaving the United States by the required date." H.R. 3137 § 4(b);
see also S. 1362 § 5(b).
The HSEA, which criminalizes a failure to maintain documented status in addition to a failure
to depart, is significantly more stringent. It should be noted that due to the complexity of immi-
gration law and the lengthy waits for service, unintentional lapses into undocumented status are
not uncommon. For example, recent research has found that California Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger may have been undocumented during two periods in the 1970s when he violated
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for illegal entry and provides for forfeiture of assets by those unlaw-
fully present.1 12 In comparison, the CLEAR Act increases both crimi-
nal and civil penalties, but does not provide for forfeiture of assets. l13
The Department of Justice is responsible for including any informa-
tion it has on immigration-law violators in the NCIC.114 The HSEA
states that local and state police should report any immigration viola-
tors they apprehend within ten days. 115 Similarly, the CLEAR Act
encourages state and local police, "[i]n compliance with section 642(a)
of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 ... and section 434 of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996" to report violators "in a
timely manner .... -116 Local and state police are not required to
receive any training prior to enforcing immigration law, although
training and resources must be developed and made available to
them. 117 Finally, the Act provides total immunity to law enforcement
personnel and agencies that are involved in the enforcement of immi-
gration laws "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law." 1 8
Because this is a federal law dealing with immigration over which
the federal government has plenary power, the statute would receive
great deference when reviewed by the courts. 119 For example, in Mat-
thews v. Diaz, the Court upheld federal restrictions on Medicare eligi-
bility that allowed only citizens and legal permanent residents that
had been residing in the United State for five years to participate in
the program. 20 Although similar state programs limiting welfare ben-
efits to aliens had been struck down, 21 the Court commented that
the terms of his visa by taking a weekly salary for consulting work and by starting a bricklaying
business while on a temporary work visa. Frank del Olmo, An Illegal-Immigration Irony:
Schwarzenegger May Have Been in Technical Violation of His U.S. Visa Not Once But Twice,
L.A. TiMES, Sept. 28, 2003, at M5.
112. S. 1362 § 5.
113. H.R. 3137 § 4.
114. Id. § 5; S. 1362 § 6.
115. S. 1362 § 4(b).
116. H.R. 3137 § 6(a) (internal citations omitted). The bills state, respectively, that the local
police "should" and are "encouraged" to report immigration violators, in compliance with cur-
rent law. Id. It is unclear why the bills use discretionary language to describe a duty that they
describe as required by law. See id.; S. 1362 § 4(b). The HSEA explicitly states it should not be
construed to require local authorities to "enforce the immigration laws of the United States." S.
1362 § 13. Both bills also explicitly state that they do not require local authorities to arrest or
report victims or witnesses of crimes. See H.R. 3137 § 3(b); S. 1362 § 13.
117. S. 1362 § 9; H.R. 3137 § 10.
118. S. 1362 § 10; H.R. 3137 § 11.
119. See Manheim, supra note 52, at 1012 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976)).
120. Mathews, 426 U.S. 67.
121. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971) (holding that Arizona and Pennsylvania
state statutes that denied welfare benefits to aliens were equal protection violations).
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"[t]he equal protection analysis also involves significantly different
considerations because it concerns the relationship between aliens and
the States rather than between aliens and the Federal Govern-
ment."'1 22 Instead, the Court considered whether a federal limitation
on noncitizens' access to Medicare benefits was "wholly irrational."'' 23
Because the CLEAR Act and the HSEA are federal legislation,
courts will apply the standard articulated in Matthews and uphold the
law if the distinctions it makes between aliens and citizens are not
"wholly irrational." Under the CLEAR Act and the HSEA, only
aliens that lack legal immigration status receive different treatment
than citizens receive by local authorities. A difference in treatment
due to an individual's violation of immigration law is not "wholly irra-
tional," but is based on an established legal distinction. Because a
statute that empowers local law enforcement to enforce federal immi-
gration law is not wholly irrational, 124 it will be upheld as a legitimate
exercise of legislative authority.
The CLEAR Act denies § 241(i) funding to any state or locality
that has a "statute, policy or practice" of prohibiting local authorities
from enforcing federal immigration law two years after the date of
enactment. 25 The HSEA goes even further and finds that these local
statutes or policies are illegal under current law.126 While these stat-
utes may not technically require the states to enforce federal immigra-
tion law, they put significant pressure on states to do so. Although the
CLEAR Act and HSEA are likely to withstand a constitutional chal-
lenge, the state laws and policies that will stem from compliance with
the CLEAR Act and HSEA will not receive the lenient deferential
standard accorded to federal statutes. 127 Instead, these state laws and
policies will be subject to challenge under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 128
122. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84-85.
123. Id. at 83 (finding "neither requirement is wholly irrational").
124. Id.
125. CLEAR Act, H.R. 3137, 109th Cong. § 3(a) (2005). INA § 241(i) currently provides for
the Attorney General to enter into a contractual arrangement to provide compensation to the
State for the detention of undocumented criminal aliens. This is administered through the State
Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP). In 2004, a nationwide total of $281,605,292 was
awarded; California received $111,899,215; Texas received $24,740,836; and New York received
$56,995,435. For a listing of awards by county and state, see Bureau of Justice Assistance,
SCAAP FY04 Awards, http:/lwww.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/O4SCAAP.pdf (last visited Feb. 23
2006) [hereinafter 2004 SCAAP Awards].
126. HSEA, S. 1362, 109th Cong. § 4(a) (2005).
127. Manheim, supra note 52, at 1011-12.
128. Id.
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B. The Discriminatory Impact of State and Local Police
Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law
The first step in analyzing the state policies that require local and
state police to enforce immigration law under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment will be to consider whether the policies classify on the basis of
alienage. These policies will authorize local police to enforce federal
immigration law and arrest undocumented individuals. In a sense,
these laws will identify a class of individuals subject to police action.
But this police action is directly linked to the individuals' violations of
immigration law. The concern is not so much over the authorization
of the police to enforce the law, but the discriminatory effect that this
policy will have on undocumented immigrants' ability to access police
services. Equal protection claims are not limited to statutes or poli-
cies that classify on their face. 129 Statutes and policies can also be
found to classify on the basis of alienage when they have a disparate
impact on aliens.1 30 For example, in Yick Wo, the Court found that a
neutral law requiring any laundry that operated in a wooden building
to apply for permission to continue operating to be discriminatory be-
cause permission was never granted to Chinese individuals, but was
granted to Caucasian individuals. 131 There the Court stated:
Though the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appear-
ance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with
an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust
and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circum-
stances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still
within the prohibition of the constitution. 132
The Supreme Court later narrowed the application of the disparate
impact theory requiring that plaintiffs not only show that the legisla-
tion affected only a suspect class, but also requiring plaintiffs to make
a prima facie case that the government action was motivated by a dis-
criminatory purpose. 133
Here, the impact of the new statutes will be felt exclusively by
aliens. Undocumented aliens, as violators of immigration law, are
subject to the consequences of those violations. There is, of course,
nothing unconstitutional about immigration enforcement itself. In
any enforcement action, aliens alone will be the target. Proponents of
this legislation see the CLEAR Act and HSEA as simply putting more
129. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 373.
132. Id. at 373-74.
133. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976).
2006] 1119
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1103
resources behind the enforcement of immigration law. 134 Because this
is clearly a legitimate purpose and a legitimate means of accomplish-
ing it, this legislation raises no equal protection questions from the
perspective of its proponents. But by forcing local and state authori-
ties to enforce immigration law, the ability of law enforcement offi-
cials to provide police services to undocumented individuals will be
threatened. 135 How the dual roles of police as protector and immigra-
tion agent will play out in practice is unclear. The feared effect will be
that undocumented immigrants will be forced to access police services
only upon "pain of deportation.' 36 For example, battered spouses 37
or crime victims would avail themselves of police protection only if
they are willing to risk deportation. Additionally, crime witnesses
would be taking quite a gamble in coming forward with informa-
tion.138 An entire community would fear and avoid any interaction
with the police because of the omnipresent risk of deportation inher-
ent in any interaction. 139 The discriminatory impact goes far beyond
134. Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act of 2003 (CLEAR Act): Hearing
on H.R. 2671, Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 1-3 (2003) [hereinafter CLEAR Act Hearing] (statement of John N.
Hostettler, Chairman, Subcomm. on Immigration, Boarder Security, and Claims), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/judiciary/89636.pdf.
135. HSEA Hearing, supra note 6, at 15-17 (statement of David Harris, Balk Professor of
Law and Values, University of Toledo College of Law).
136. See Maya, supra note 100, at 1637.
137. The NOW Legal Defense Fund reports that fear of deportation is the most significant
barrier in the reporting of domestic abuse by battered women. CLEAR Act Hearing, supra note
134, at 111 (statement of Katherine Culliton, Legislative Staff Attorney, Mexican American Le-
gal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF)).
138. Fear of deportation already plays a significant role in reducing the number of crimes
reported. MALDEF listed a number of situations where police have taken action to deport
crime victims or witnesses, despite the protection currently available. One example that
MALDEF cites is as follows:
"Jorge" is a sixteen-year-old boy who went to the police after escaping a kidnapping
situation, in which he was held captive and tortured by a gang of boys for days. Instead
of helping Jorge, the police turned him over to immigration and although he was a
crime victim with no criminal record himself, he was sent to a maximum-security juve-
nile facility in Spokane, Washington.
CLEAR Act Hearing, supra note 134, at 111 (statement of Mexican American Legal Defense
and Education Fund).
The 2005 versions of the CLEAR Act and HSEA explicitly state that local authorities are not
required to arrest or report crime victims or witnesses. But local authorities are still fully capa-
ble of arresting or reporting these vulnerable individuals. Without a policy prohibiting the arrest
or the reporting of crime victims or witnesses, these sections of the CLEAR Act and HSEA are
likely to do little to alleviate the fear of these individuals, resulting in continued avoidance of
police contact.
139. See Maya, supra note 100, at 1637. In Mody v. City of Hoboken, 758 F. Supp. 1027, 1028
(D.N.J. 1991), the plaintiff sued the police department claiming that his equal protection rights
were violated by an implied policy not to prosecute individuals who were committing crimes
against the Indian community. Id. The court found that
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the enforcement action and includes the expanded effect of reduced
access to police protection.
Proponents of the legislation claim that "police and prosecutors
would retain the discretion ... not to take action with respect to the
witnesses to or the victims of crime; second, immigrant victims of
many crimes are eligible for relief, particularly under the U visa pro-
gram. Battered spouses are eligible for additional relief, including can-
cellation of removal."1 40 The mitigating effect of this potential relief,
however, is questionable.1 41 Although some victims may be able to
avail themselves to certain forms of immigration relief, many will be
ineligible. 142 In addition, leaving the prosecution of undocumented
immigration to the discretion of the police and prosecutors provides
little security and certainty to undocumented victims and witnesses
who may want to come to the police but have no idea what conse-
quences they will face for taking such action. The potential availabil-
ity of relief is too tenuous to address the aversion entire communities
will have towards interacting with the police.
In addition, the effect of this new legislation will sweep much more
broadly than will the available relief. Although only undocumented
immigrants are subject to immigration enforcement, many undocu-
mented immigrants are part of communities and families that consist
[a]n express or implied policy which permits or condones attacks upon members of a
particular minority group is the very evil which the post-Civil War statutes sought to
eradicate. If law enforcement turns away from a victim solely because of the victim's
race, religion, or national origin, equal protection of the laws is rendered meaningless.
Id.
140. CLEAR Act Hearing, supra note 134, at 2 (statement of John N. Hostettler, Chairman of
the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims).
141. To qualify for a U visa, the individual must meet four conditions:
1. The alien has suffered substantial physical or mental abuse as a result of having been
a victim of the certain criminal activity ... and
2. The alien ... possesses information concerning that certain criminal activity...
3. The alien.., has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful to a Federal,
State, or local law enforcement official; to a Federal, State, or local prosecutor; to a
Federal or State judge, to the Service; or to other Federal, State, or local authorities
investigating or prosecuting one of the certain criminal activities . . .; and
4. The criminal activity described violated the laws of the United States or occurred in
the United States ....
Memorandum froai Michael D. Cronin, Acting Executive Associate Comm'r, Immigration and
Naturalization Service to Michael A. Pearson, Executive Associate Comm'r (Aug. 30, 2001),
reprinted in 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1751, 1760-61 app. 11 (2001). The spouses, children, and
parents of children under sixteen may also qualify for a U visa. Id. No regulations have been
issued to date.
142. No individual would be guaranteed access to such relief before calling the police. The
police or prosecutor must exercise some discretion in determining that the individual has been
helpful or is likely to be helpful in the investigation or prosecution. Calling the police would still
be a gamble. Memorandum from Michael D. Cronin, supra note 141, at 1761.
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of a combination of undocumented immigrants, legal permanent re-
sidents, individuals with various forms of temporary permission to be
in the United States, and United States citizens. 143 All individuals in
these mixed families and communities will be hesitant to call for po-
lice services when they recognize the severe consequences that this
decision could have on their family members and neighbors with un-
documented statuses. 144 As a result, the effects of this new system will
sweep broadly and limit access to police services for all aliens and
even some United States citizens closely tied to immigrant
communities. 145
Any plaintiff will still face the significant hurdle of proving a dis-
criminatory purpose.146 Although a discriminatory purpose can be in-
ferred from the "totality of the relevant facts,' 1 47 this presents the
greatest barrier to an equal protection challenge. If a plaintiff can
allege sufficient facts to infer a discriminatory purpose, a court could
find that a facially neutral law has the impact of denying undocu-
mented aliens and their communities access to police protection and
as such is subject to equal protection analysis.
C. Standard of Scrutiny
In order to determine the standard of scrutiny used in an equal pro-
tection claim against a local or state policy of enforcing federal immi-
gration law, it is necessary to determine whether the class affected is a
suspect class. The class that is being denied equal protection through
a denial of police protection could be defined broadly or narrowly. A
broad definition would recognize that immigrant communities as a
whole will be denied access to police protection as a result of these
143. MICHAEL E. Fix & WENDY ZIMMERMANN, ALL UNDER ONE ROOF: MIXED-STATUS
FAMILIES IN AN ERA OF REFORM (1999), available at http://www.urban.org/urlprint.cfm?ID=
6599.
144. This effect has been seen in other situations where individuals do not feel comfortable
interacting with the police. Communities must develop creative ways of providing for their own
protection. In one instance, in Chicago public housing, police responded to a drug call but found
only one individual outside the building. They took the man to a local basketball court and
started to beat him. A gang member wanted to intervene but feared the consequences of calling
the police. Instead, he called an ambulance directly from a neighbor's house in the hope that the
arrival of the paramedics would end the beating. Upon the approach of the ambulance, the
police left the scene, leaving the man on the basketball court. Interview with David Eads, Tech-
nology Coordinator, Invisible Institute, in Chicago, Ill. (Nov. 15, 2004).
145. On average one out of ten United States families with children is a mixed family-with at
least one citizen and one undocumented member. Fix & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 143, at 1.
This chilling effect is already seen in other areas. Children with U.S. citizenship and undocu-
mented parents are much less likely to receive the benefits for which they qualify. Id.
146. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976).
147. Id. at 242.
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laws. Access to police services would be denied to aliens in general,
not just undocumented aliens. Aliens have been clearly recognized as
a suspect class deserving of strict scrutiny. 148 If strict scrutiny is re-
quired of these laws, they will likely be held unconstitutional.
But state and local enforcement of federal immigration law can be
considered narrowly in that only the undocumented actually risk de-
portation when they call the police. Plyler explicitly refused to recog-
nize illegal aliens as a suspect class because their status is the result of
a voluntary violation of immigration law. 149 Nonsuspect classes usu-
ally receive mere rational basis scrutiny.150 But Plyler did not go on to
apply rational basis scrutiny.1 51 Instead, the Court was concerned
about the importance of the interest involved (public education) 152
and the innocence of the children affected. 153 Although these chil-
dren were undocumented immigrants, their status was not the result
of a decision that they made and for which they could be held respon-
sible.1 54 The Court went on to require that the denial of public educa-
tion to undocumented children be justified by a substantial state
interest. 155
Some of the same concerns that caused the Court in Plyler to in-
crease the level of scrutiny are present in the denial of police protec-
tion to undocumented immigrants. The effect of state law authorizing
local police enforcement of federal immigration laws will undoubtedly
affect a significant number of individuals that did not make a voli-
tional choice to violate immigration laws. 156 But the scope of the ef-
fects will sweep far beyond that. Whole communities will be affected
by the attempt to minimize contact with the police.1 57 This lack of
police protection will affect everyone regardless of their immigration
status.
In addition, the interest involved is extremely important, if not fun-
damental. 158 Police services are central to the orderly functioning of
our society. Lawrence Rosenthal, Deputy Corporation Counsel in the
City of Chicago Department of Law, has argued that police protection
148. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); Manheim, supra note 52, at 1010.
149. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982).
150. Manheim, supra note 52, at 1010-11.
151. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224.
152. Id. at 221-23; Maya, supra note 100, at 1635.
153. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219-20.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 230.
156. For example, undocumented children, whose violation of immigration laws must be at-
tributed to their parents' decision, would be affected by local police enforcement.
157. See infra notes 210-214 and accompanying text.
158. Rosenthal, supra note 101, at 71-74.
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is a fundamental right that the Constitution expressly recognizes in
guaranteeing individuals "equal protection under the laws.' 59 In ad-
dition, one of the major problems that the Fourteenth Amendment
was intended to address was the lack of police protection for African
Americans who were subject to extensive violence. 160 At the time,
legal commentators believed that "one of the basic obligations that
the government owed its people was to protect their persons and
property." 161 But this right is judicially underenforced due to the po-
tentially large number of claims that could be filed by individuals who
do not feel that they received adequate police protection. Nonvictims
who attempt to bring claims face problems with standing. 162 Instead,
the political branches of government give substance to this right, with
guidance from the public's expectation of equal protection in polic-
ing.163 Because it would be politically inappropriate to provide une-
qual and imbalanced services, law enforcement policy focuses on
policing different neighborhoods equally.1 64
Prior cases by undocumented aliens challenging laws on the basis of
equal protection have been unsuccessful in receiving a heightened
level of scrutiny used in Plyler. But the importance of the interest
involved has never reached the level of public education for children.
The interests involved included access to a drug treatment program, 65
eligibility for Permafund dividend payments, 166 and eligibility for a
driver's license. 167 While these interests are important, the effect of
the denial of these interests cannot be compared to the effect of deny-
ing children access to education.' 68 But the interest of access to police
159. Id. at 66 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
160. Rosenthal quoted Representative John Bingham, who proposed the language for the
Fourtheenth Amendment that was eventually adopted, during the debate over the Fourteenth
Amendment: "No State ever had the right ... to deny to any freeman the equal protection of the
laws or to abridge the privileges or immunities of any citizen of the Republic, although many of
them have assumed and exercised the power, and that without remedy." Id.
161. Id. at 68.
162. A community resident concerned about inadequate policing in the area would have
trouble establishing that, because of the lack of police protection, he or she was likely to be
victimized in the future as this is rather speculative. A crime victim who brought a claim would
have difficulty establishing that the lack of police protection, and not the criminal act, was the
proximate cause of his injuries. Id. at 75-76.
163. Id. at 78.
164. Rosenthal, supra note 101, at 78.
165. People v. Arciga, 227 Cal. Rptr. 611 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
166. Dep't of Revenue v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1993).
167. Doe v. State Dep't of Public Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
168. The Court in Plyler noted:
The inestimable toll of that deprivation on the social economic, intellectual, and psy-
chological well-being of the individual, and the obstacle it poses to individual achieve-
ment, make it most difficult to reconcile the cost or the principle of a status-based
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protection may reach a level of importance that is on par with educa-
tion. 69 Police protection is essential to protect the lives, safety, and
property of residents. It prevents individuals from being victimized.
When individuals are victimized, police provide justice and security.
There is a long tradition in our nation's history of the public's expecta-
tion of police protection, 170 even if current case law refuses to recog-
nize any right to this protection. 171 The importance of police
protection should be sufficient to invoke a heightened Plyler-style
scrutiny. 172
The importance of the interest in police protection and the broad
effect that these statutes will have on innocent populations may be
sufficient to invoke a Plyler-style level of heightened scrutiny. The
Plyler level of scrutiny does not fit neatly into an equal protection
framework. Some have identified it as a form of intermediate scru-
tiny. 173 Others consider it "rational basis with a bite.' 74 In either
case, courts would be looking at whether the state can assert a sub-
stantial state interest.
D. What Is the Importance of the State Interest Involved?
The stated purpose of both the CLEAR Act and the HSEA is "[T]o
provide for enhanced Federal, State, and local assistance in the en-
forcement of the immigrations laws .... ",175 The CLEAR Act re-
quires states to engage in immigration enforcement to avoid a halt to
one source of funding for their law enforcement agencies. 76 The
HSEA establishes that a policy against enforcing immigration law is a
violation of federal law.' 77 Presumably many states would not be mo-
tivated by the same purpose as the proposed legislation. Their pri-
mary purpose would be preventing the loss of federal funding for the
detention of criminal aliens1 78 or avoiding a violation of federal law.
denial of basic education within the framework of equality embodied in the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982).
169. Maya, supra note 100, at 1635.
170. Rosenthal, supra note 101, at 68.
171. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs. 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989).
172. Maya, supra note 100, at 1635.
173. Id.; see also Dep't of Revenue v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 627 (Alaska 1993).
174. Manheim, supra note 52, at 1011.
175. CLEAR Act, H.R. 3137, 109th Cong. (2005); see also HSEA, S. 1362, 109th Cong. (2005).
176. H.R. 3137 § 3(a).
177. S. 1362 § 4(a).
178. Some states such as Montana, which received $2,792 in 2004, have little to lose in the way
of SCAAP funding. Other states, such as California, stand to lose well over one hundred million
dollars per year, giving them little choice but to participate in immigration enforcement. 2004
SCAAP Awards, supra note 125.
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States have not taken it upon themselves to adopt these policies vol-
untarily. 179 In fact, a large number of local police departments have
explicit policies prohibiting the enforcement of immigration law.' 80
Numerous officials have expressed concern regarding the proposed
CLEAR Act and HSEA and the effects they would have in their com-
munities. 181 Gordon Quan, Mayor Pro Tem of Houston and represen-
tative of the National Leagues of Cities, expressed his concern that
the CLEAR Act would threaten community policing and the "com-
mitment to assure that justice is dispensed equally and not based on
race, gender, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, disabilities,
education, or economic status of the victims or perpetrators. ' 182
But states may be motivated by their own legitimate interests in
addition to the loss of funding.1 83 States have an interest in the en-
forcement of all laws, federal or state. Furthermore, states have an
interest in preserving their resources and job opportunities for those
who are lawfully present. In addition, states often pay the bills for
medical costs due to emergency care for undocumented individuals. 8 4
Proponents of this legislation have also argued that it serves the
legitimate state interests in preventing crime and addressing national
security concerns. 185 But the actual relation of the CLEAR Act and
the HSEA to these concerns is questionable. Local and state police
are fully authorized and able to take action against criminal aliens. 86
The CLEAR Act adds nothing to their authority to deal with individ-
uals with criminal histories or who are accused of committing a crime.
While having an undocumented population does raise national secur-
ity concerns because of the inability to track this group of people, ag-
gressive police action in these communities is likely to undermine
police relationships and result in a reduction of information available
179. Although no state has enacted a CLEAR-style statute, some individual cities have relied
on the Attorney General's theory of inherent authority to begin enforcing immigration laws. See
Pham, supra note 47, at 970.
180. Chadwick M. Graham, Defeating an Invisible Enemy: The Western Superpowers' Efforts
to Combat Terrorism by Fighting Illegal Immigration, 14 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
281, 307 (2004).
181. CLEAR Act Hearing, supra note 134, at 35-37 (statement of Gordon Quan, Mayor Pro
Tem, Houston, Texas); HSEA Hearing, supra note 6, at 15-17 (statement of David A. Harris,
Balk Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo College of Law).
182. CLEAR Act Hearing, supra note 134, at 40 (statement of Gordon Quan, Mayor Pro
Tem, Houston, Texas, quoting the National League of Cities policy).
183. Id. at 13-16 (statement of John M. Morganelli, District Attorney, Northamptom County,
Pennsylvania).
184. Id. at 52.
185. Id.; HSEA Hearing, supra note 6, at 12-15 (statement of Michelle Malkin, Investigative
Journalist and Author, Bethesda, MD).
186. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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to the police from these communities. Arguably, the police have the
tools necessary to address these state concerns-local enforcement of
immigration law under the HSEA and the CLEAR Act would be un-
likely to further these aims.
Despite the argument that the state law is not unrelated to the state
interests, these laws are likely to survive rational basis review. To sur-
vive this lenient review, the state only needs to demonstrate that its
purposes behind the law are legitimate. None of the purposes dis-
cussed above involve any illegitimate purpose, such as a bare animus
toward a minority group. Although one can argue that the state laws'
relationship to the asserted purposes is tenuous, rational basis review
is not a searching review. The asserted relationship will most likely be
sufficient, and the state laws will likely survive rational basis review.
The real question will arise if the courts apply a heightened level of
scrutiny and require that the state assert a substantial state interest.
States' interest in preserving their resources is clearly a legitimate
state interest.1 87 But it did not suffice to satisfy the substantial state
interest standard when presented in Plyler.188 Similarly, preserving
job opportunities has been upheld as a legitimate state interest, but it
seems no more likely to be a substantial state interest than preserving
state resources. 189 The purposes of providing for national security and
reducing crime may not be sufficiently related to this piece of legisla-
tion to survive a court's review because this legislation has no effect
whatsoever on the authority of local police to respond to criminal ac-
tivity.190 If a court applies a heightened level of scrutiny, these stat-
utes will not be able to withstand Fourteenth Amendment challenges.
IV. IMPACT
A new scheme of state and local enforcement raises many concerns
in addition to questions of constitutionality. Will these new measures
be effective means of enforcing immigration law?191 Will they hamper
police forces in their law enforcement mission? 192 Will they subject
police to increased liability for civil rights violations? 193 What effect
187. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 493 (1977).
188. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
189. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 365 (1976) (holding that a California law prohibiting the
knowing employment of an alien without work authorization was a valid exercise of state
power).
190. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
191. See infra notes 197-209 and accompanying text.
192. See infra notes 210-214 and accompanying text.
193. See infra notes 215-215 and accompanying text.
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will they have on foreign policy? 194 Will they result in an unconstitu-
tional lack of uniformity in immigration enforcement?' 95 Will they
infringe on the delicate balance between states and the federal gov-
ernment inherent in our system of federalism?' 96 This section ad-
dresses the impact of the CLEAR Act and the HSEA.
A. The CLEAR Act and HSEA Are Ineffective Responses to
Undocumented Immigration and the Terrorist Threat
The CLEAR Act and HSEA are responses to an increasing concern
over ineffective immigration enforcement. 197 As the large undocu-
mented population demonstrates, the United States has been unable
to control its borders. Despite past efforts, which have included in-
creased border patrols, earned legalization, and sanctioned employers
who hire undocumented immigrants, the undocumented population is
higher than ever.' 98 Concern over this failure has been justifiably
heightened by the increased threat of terrorism. In congressional
hearings regarding the 2003 HSEA, committee members pointed out
several mundane encounters the September 11th hijackers had with
police involving traffic stops that could have served as opportunities
for immigration enforcement action. 99 For example, police ticketed
Mohammed Atta in Florida for driving without a license while he was
undocumented, but did not detain him.200 The number of immigra-
tion enforcement personnel is simply not sufficient to support large
scale enforcement actions given the number of undocumented individ-
uals.20 1 Engaging local police departments is a logical way to increase
194. See infra notes 224-228 and accompanying text.
195. See infra notes 229-232 and accompanying text.
196. See infra notes 233-238 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., CLEAR Act Hearing, supra note 134, at 1-3 (statement of John N. Hostettler,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Immigration, Boarder Security, and Claims).
198. Espenshade, supra note 1, at 200-01, 211-12.
199. HSEA Hearing, supra note 6, at 2 (statement of Sen. Saxby Chambliss, Chairman, Immi-
gration, Border Security and Citizenship Subcomm.).
200. Graham, supra note 180, at 288-89.
201. Although numbers remain insufficient, the federal government has taken action to in-
crease the number of enforcement personnel. The Congressional Research Service noted:
Prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the INS had fewer than 2,000 immi-
gration agents to enforce immigration laws within the United States. Although that
number has not changed since the terrorist attacks, the merger of the interior enforce-
ment function of the former INS with the investigative arm of the U.S. Customs Service
(Customs) into the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which is
located in DHS [Department of Homeland Security], has doubled the number of inte-
rior agents potentially available to enforce immigration laws.
CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV., REPORT FOR CONGRESS, ENFORCING IMMIGRATION LAW: THE
ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT (2004), http://www.taasa.org/trafficking/Law
Enfrole.pdf.
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personnel and take advantage of contacts with undocumented individ-
uals that would ordinarily occur in the process of routine police
work.202 In addition, immigration enforcement actions are favored as
alternatives to terrorism prosecution for certain terrorism suspects be-
cause they are simpler and cheaper.20 3
Presumably, deputizing local police to enforce immigration viola-
tions would increase the number of individuals apprehended for vio-
lating immigration law, including individuals with criminal records and
terrorist ties. 20 4 But the statistics offered by the proponents of the
legislation show these criminal or terrorist aliens make up less than
one percent of the number of individuals who would be affected by
this new legislation. 20 5 Even if these aliens were more extensively
targeted for enforcement, it is likely that the vast majority of individu-
als apprehended through the local and state enforcement action would
be individuals whose only violations would be unlawful presence in
the United States.20 6 Those individuals apprehended even through
enhanced enforcement action would only constitute a tiny percentage
of the millions of undocumented residing in the United States. 20 7 The
objective of effective control over those who enter and reside in the
United States is not obtainable through enforcement action alone.
Relying on enforcement is ineffective and will create significant eco-
nomic and social disruptions as employers lose their employees and as
families lose their fathers, mothers, and other relatives. Some form of
legalization will be necessary to prevent these disruptions and to rec-
ognize the infeasibility of deporting ten million individuals. Enforce-
ment alone fails to address the primary motivations that induce
202. According to one proponent:
A law such as the CLEAR Act would provide the manpower and information-sharing
capabilities necessary to shore up the long-standing weakness of interior enforcement.
It would also produce a deterrent effect, because potential terrorists would not only
have to enter the United States, but would also be faced with the difficulty of remaining
undetected.
Graham, supra note 180, at 307.
203. Id. Although simpler and cheaper, removal proceedings appear to be significantly less
effective in neutralizing the threat presented by individuals that the United States truly believes
are engaged in terrorist activity. Nora V. Demleitner, Misguided Prevention: The War on Terror-
.a ..ar on I. .mmigr fendes and Jhniai'utn Violaaiurs, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 2 (2004).
Removal actions simply return individuals to their country of citizenship, leaving them un-
restricted in their course of action and unsupervised by the United States government. Id. There
is a persuasive argument that removal increases the danger of terrorist activity when compared
to the alternative of ongoing surveillance within the United States. Id.
204. CLEAR Act Hearing, supra note 134, at 87 (statement of Gordon Quan, Mayor Pro
Tem, Houston, Texas).
205. Id.
206. See id.
207. Id.
20061 1129
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1103
individuals to take the risk of immigrating illegally: economic oppor-
tunities and family reunification.2 08 Any effective solution must at-
tempt to provide reasonable legal alternatives to address these
needs. 20 9 The CLEAR Act and HSEA are inadequate to achieve the
goals that motivated their creation.
B. The CLEAR Act and HSEA's Negative Impact
on Law Enforcement Goals
The CLEAR Act and HSEA are not only inefficient methods of
dealing with undocumented immigration, but they also raise signifi-
208. For many individuals, no legal means of immigrating exists. Employment visas are re-
stricted primarily to individuals with significant education and skills. See Craig Miley, Employ-
ment-Based Immigration: The First Three Preferences, in SELECTED FUNDAMENTALS OF
IMMIGRATION LAW 67 (2005). Family-based immigration requires that the family member in the
United States be a citizen or legal permanent resident. See Susan Fortino-Brown, Family Spon-
sored Immigration, in SELECTED FUNDAMENTALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW, supra, at 239. For
those who do qualify for an immigrant visa, the wait is significant. According to the November
2005 visa bulletin, the spouse of a legal permanent resident must wait four years after his or her
petition is approved for an immigrant visa. For individuals from Mexico, the wait is seven years.
U.S. Dep't of State, Visa Bulletin for March 2006, http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletinlbulletin
_2805.html (Feb. 23, 2006).
209. Various options for immigration reform have been proposed. President George W. Bush
proposed a temporary worker program on January 7, 2004. His plan would allow undocumented
workers, along with individuals overseas, to apply for temporary status that would allow them to
continue to work in the United States for three years. The status could be renewed. When the
status expired, temporary workers would be required to return to their home country. The plan
provides workers with credit in their national retirement systems for the work they did in the
United States. Temporary status would not lead to permanent resident status or citizenship. The
White House, Fact Sheet: Fair and Secure Immigration Reform (Jan. 7, 2004), http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040107-1.html. The Democratic proposal in the 108th Con-
gress was the Safe, Orderly Legal Visas and Enforcement Act of 2004 (SOLVE Act), S. 2381,
108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 4262, 108th Cong. (2004). This bill includes an earned adjustment for
individuals who can show twenty-four months of employment in the United States. American
Immigration Lawyers Association, Comprehensive Immigration Reform: Major Legislation to
Be Introduced, at 2, http://www.aila.org/fileViewer.aspx?doclD=9840 (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
The SOLVE Act also includes provisions to reduce the backlog in family-based immigration
applications and worker visa reforms that target temporary low- and semi-skilled workers. Id.
Finally, the SOLVE Act requires a more strenuous process through which employers would have
to show that U.S. workers are unavailable for the position and provides increased protection for
temporary workers. Id. Many of the SOLVE Act provisions are included in the bipartisan
Immigration Reform Act of 2004, S. 2010, 108th Cong. (2004). Section 2010 includes an earned
adjustment, a new worker visa, work protection provisions, and backlog reductions for family
reunification, but varies from the SOLVE Act in the specifics of these provisions. American
Immigration Lawyers Association, supra, at 3. The Border Security and Immigration Improve-
ment Act, S. 1461, 108th Cong. (2003), H.R. 2899, 108th Cong. (2003), includes an opportunity
for undocumented individuals to apply for temporary status and creates new worker visas.
American Immigration Lawyers Association, supra, at 4. Finally, the Border Security and Immi-
gration Reform Act, S. 1387, 108th Cong. (2003), creates a guestworker program, which allows
individuals to eventually apply for permanent residence. American Immigration Lawyers Asso-
ciation, supra, at 4-5.
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cant policy concerns. In response to the threat of increased enforce-
ment, immigrant communities would avoid interaction with the
police.210 Victims and witnesses would have to risk deportation in or-
der to approach the police. Whole communities with individuals of
mixed immigration status would shun police interactions.2 11 Addi-
tionally, immigrants would more likely be targeted for abuse because
their abusers would know that they could not turn to the police.212
The undocumented community's status as an underclass, as recog-
nized by the Court in Plyler,2 13 would be reinforced by their intensi-
fied isolation. As a result of these deteriorating relationships, the
police would likely lose the assistance of the immigrant community in
the war on terror. 21 4 A prime source for intelligence information, im-
migrants would feel unsafe providing tips to law enforcement.
210. CLEAR Act Hearing, supra note 134, at 37 (statement of Gordon Quan, Mayor Pro
Tern, Houston, Texas).
211. Similar concerns regarding limited accessibility of an essential service were raised by the
Undocumented Alien Emergency Medical Assistance Amendments of 2004, H.R. 3722, 108th
Cong. (2004). This legislation would require hospital emergency rooms to report the immigra-
tion status of anyone they treat in order to receive federal reimbursements. For individuals who
were not able to demonstrate their immigration status, the hospital would be required to finger-
print. Id. The fear is that such legislation would cause individuals to avoid life-saving emergency
medical services, endangering the individuals' health as well as public health in general. Lack of
emergency police service in severe circumstances can have the same life threatening effect. H.R.
3722 was defeated on May 18, 2004 by a vote of 331 to 88. H.R 3722, Bill Summary and Status,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d09:h.r.03722: (last visited Mar. 16, 2006).
212. One scholar believes that "[b]y requiring local police to investigate and enforce federal
immigration law, the CLEAR Act would undercut the central message of laws like VAWA [Vio-
lence Against Women Act], which encourage victims of violence to turn to their local police for
protection rather than enduring abuse out of fear of detection and deportation." Margot Men-
delson, The Legal Production of Identities: A Narrative Analysis of Conversations with Battered
Undocumented Women, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 138, 211 (2004). Discussing the effect of
the CLEAR Act on battered immigrant women, Commentator Janet Calvo said:
One of the main purposes behind the Violence Against Women Acts in 1994 and 2000
was to make it possible for women and children who were victims of crimes to be able
to report these crimes to law enforcement. Abusers often told their victims they would
be deported and never see their children again if they reported the abuse to the police.
Studies showed that the fear of deportation prevented high percentages of battered
immigrants from contacting law enforcement about the abuse.
In the current climate, there is no mention in the proposed legislation [referring to
the CLEAR Act] or the statements in support of the proposals of the relatively re-
cently passed provisions of Violence Against Women Act. There is not even a sense
that legislators have considered the recent laws that had the purpose of promoting re-
porting and prosecution of crimes, and after consideration determined that these goals
had to be sacrificed for other more important public objectives. The arrest and prose-
cution objectives in the context of spouse abuse are completely ignored.
Janet Calvo, A Decade of Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: Coverture's Diminishment, But Not
Its Demise, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 153, 207-08 (2004).
213. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 (1982).
214. CLEAR Act Hearing, supra note 134, at 37 (statement of Gordon Quan, Mayor Pro
Tem, Houston, Texas).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
C. Increased Civil Rights Liability for Local Police
Local and state police may face increased liability for civil rights
violations. The CLEAR Act and HSEA provide civil immunity for
police officers and law enforcement agencies involved in enforcing im-
migration law "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law .... -215
Presumptively, police officers and agencies may still be liable under
§ 1981 for racial discrimination. 21 6  Especially with no training re-
quirement, 217 it seems likely that officers may resort to using a foreign
appearance as a proxy for probable cause of an immigration viola-
tion.218 For example, in 1997, the police department of Chandler, Ari-
zona, in conjunction with the INS, undertook an enforcement action
aimed at apprehending undocumented immigrants in the town.21 9 Al-
though 432 individuals were deported, many citizens and permanent
residents were stopped multiple times based on their appearance or
their use of the Spanish language.220 In addition, police officers en-
tered schools, residences, and businesses in search of undocumented
individuals.2 21 As a result, the city faced two lawsuits and paid more
than half a million dollars to settle the claims.222 It is likely that poten-
tial liability for civil rights violations committed by an untrained police
force will greatly increase the costs that cities and states will have to
bear in the enforcement of federal immigration law.
215. CLEAR Act, H.R. 3137, 109th Cong. § 11 (2005); HSEA, S. 1362, 109th Cong. § 10
(2005).
216. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000).
217. H.R. 3137 § 10(e)(3); S. 1362 § 9(c). By contrast, federal immigration enforcement
agents receive four-and-a-half months of training in a residential program. Bureau of Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement, Immigration Enforcement Agent, http://www.ice.gov/graphics/
careers/invest/invest-iea.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
218. Keblawi, supra note 31, at 848. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885
(1975), the Court held that the Mexican ancestry of the occupants of a car was not sufficient to
provide reasonable suspicion to stop the car under the Fourth Amendment, but noted that the
officer can "assess the facts in light of his experience in detecting illegal entry and smuggling"
including "the characteristic appearance of persons who live in Mexico, relying on such factors as
the mode of dress and haircut." Id. But reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable
cause. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); Wishnie, supra note 31, at 1107 (discussing the
role ethnicity currently plays in federal immigration enforcement). Wishnie analyzed data col-
lected by the Department of Homeland Security and showed that ethnicity currently is a signifi-
cant factor in the level of scrutiny an individual receives through the inspection process.
Wishnie, supra note 31, at 1107. In looking at data from John F. Kennedy Airport in New York,
Hispanics received 1.42 times as many discretionary referrals to secondary inspections or adverse
actions as did non-Hispanics. Id. at 1108.
219. Pham, supra note 47, at 985.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. ("Perhaps more damaging was the distrust that the local enforcement caused with the
local immigrant community, creating, in the words of the Arizona Attorney General, 'an atmos-
phere of fear and uncertainty in the particular targeted zone and beyond."').
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D. Local Enforcement and Foreign Policy
The CLEAR Act and HSEA will presumably strain foreign policy
with our allies. Traditionally, immigration enforcement has remained
exclusively within the federal domain for several policy reasons. 223
Immigration enforcement is a component of foreign policy. 224 A
number of our allies have significant immigrant populations in the
United States.225 A perception of significant maltreatment through
the lack of police protection could threaten our relationship with our
allies. For example, several Mexican citizens were arrested for immi-
gration violations directly outside of their consulate in San Diego.226
Mexico criticized this action, perceiving it as an attack of its ability to
provide consular services for its citizens here in the United States. 227
Incidents like this one will likely become more common when myriad
local communities shape their own enforcement actions in their re-
spective communities. The federal authorities will be unable to super-
impose their unique foreign policy objectives and concerns on local
police departments across the nation. A decentralized enforcement
plan makes it more difficult to control the effect of immigration en-
forcement on foreign policy. Because the assistance of foreign nations
is essential in detecting known terrorists, damage to foreign relations
could carry a high price.228
223. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
224. See Pham, supra note 47, at 998.
225. According to the 2000 Census, 31.1 million, or 11.1% of the U.S. population, is foreign
born. Of those individuals, 9.2 million are from Mexico, 1.5 million are from China, and 1.4
million are from the Philippines. NOLAN MALONE ET AL., THE FOREIGN BORN POPULATION:
2000 (2003), http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-34.pdf.
226. Pham, supra note 47, at 1001.
227. Id.
228. Graham, supra note 180, at 295. In addition, the diminished access to police protection
by immigrants as a result of local enforcement of immigration law carries with it implications
under international law. Explaining the duty a state owes aliens within its borders, one commen-
tator noted:
In consequence of the right of protection over its subjects abroad which every State
enjoys, and the corresponding duty of every State to treat aliens on its territory with a
certain consideration, an alien ... must be afforded protection for his person and prop-
erty.... [Elvery State is by the Law of Nations compelled to grant to aliens at least
equality before the law with its citizens, as far as safety of person and property is
concerned.
L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 320, at 687-88 (8th ed. 1955) (internal
citations omitted).
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E. Local Enforcement and the Constitutional
Mandate of Uniformity
Local and state police enforcement is likely to create constitutional
problems beyond the scope of equal protection. Issues concerning the
uniformity of immigration enforcement will also be raised.2 29 Each
locality, especially in the absence of training, is likely to structure its
enforcement actions differently. The Constitution, however, man-
dates that federal immigration law be uniform.230 In order for immi-
gration law to be uniform, it must be enforced in the same way across
the country. Enforcement actions that are shaped by local resources,
policy, and priority will effectively create different immigration
laws. 231 If a person with undocumented status has an entirely differ-
ent enforcement experience in California than in Montana, this would
violate the constitutional mandate. 232 Because local police forces will
be left to their own devices to determine how to enforce federal civil
immigration law, an unconstitutional lack of uniformity in immigra-
tion law is virtually guaranteed.
F. Local Enforcement and Federalism
This new delegation of responsibility to local law enforcement per-
sonnel also damages our system of federalism. Immigration is an area
exclusively controlled by the federal government.233 The CLEAR Act
and HSEA would enroll local and state police in the mission of immi-
gration enforcement. Because the acceptance of these new duties is
229. Pham, supra note 47, at 995.
230. The Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o establish a uniform Rule of Naturaliza-
tion .... " U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. Enforcement action by federal officers in different
jurisdictions still "reflects a unitary federal policy about how many resources to devote to immi-
gration enforcement, where to concentrate enforcement, and even when to refrain from enforce-
ment. Local enforcement, even at the invitation of the federal government, could never be
similarly unitary." Pham, supra note 47, at 996-97.
231. One scholar described the effect of decentralized enforcement: "[Liocal enforcement will
result in a 'thousand borders' problem, violating the constitutional mandate for uniform immi-
gration laws as local authorities will enforce federal immigration laws differently, creating, in
effect, different immigration laws." Pham, supra note 47, at 995.
232. Prior attempts at state and local immigration enforcement actions have also raised consti-
tutional concerns under the preemption doctrine because the federal government has plenary
power over immigration and because "Congress fully occupies the field, supplemental (even
harmonious) state law is forbidden." Manheim, supra note 52, at 959. The HSEA and the
CLEAR Act would expressly delegate the power to enforce immigration law to the states. But
see Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal
Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001), for an argument that when the federal
government does devolve immigration powers to the states by statute, the federal statute should
no longer receive deference due to the plenary power and should instead be scrutinized under
the Equal Protection Clause for discrimination.
233. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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not mandatory, but rather conditioned on the receipt of federal fund-
ing, concerns regarding the conscription of state officials to complete
federal duties in violation of the Tenth Amendment probably will not
prevail because the action is justified by Congress's spending
power.234
Although a finding of a Tenth Amendment violation is unlikely,
both the CLEAR Act and the HSEA raise concerns regarding an in-
fringement on our system of federalism. The separate state and fed-
eral systems create a balance of power that protects individual
rights.235 The CLEAR Act and the HSEA blur the line between fed-
eral and state enforcement mechanisms, giving states power histori-
cally retained exclusively by the federal government. Many large
cities have enacted policies that prevent police officers from having
any role in immigration enforcement. 236 By prohibiting these policies
and encouraging all states and localities to adopt federal procedures,
the federal government prevents the states from acting as laboratories
of ideas.237 This is unfortunate because states and localities are closer
to the people and can be more responsive to the practical concerns of
such policies. 238 The CLEAR Act and HSEA undercut the benefits of
our federalist system.
V. CONCLUSION
Federal authorities have long held sole responsibility for the en-
forcement of civil immigration law.239 This division of labor ensured
complex immigration law was correctly and fairly enforced. In addi-
tion, local and state police did not have to expend their limited re-
sources by taking on responsibility for an enormous number of
violations. As a result of the United States's recent experience with
234. In South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), the Court found that the conditioning of
highway money on the establishment of twenty-one as the age for legal drinking did not violate
the Tenth Amendment. But Dole did not involve the conscription of state or local officials to
implement a federal regulatory scheme. The Supreme Court has yet to decide a case in which
Congress used its Spending Clause authority to conscript state officers into federal service, as it
does in the CLEAR Act. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7, 17
(2001). In Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1197 (10th Cir. 2000), the Tenth Circuit consid-
ered a statute in which Congress had conditioned the receipt of federal Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families funds on the state taking into account certain conduct, like child support en-
forcement. The court found this to be a legitimate exercise of the spending power. Id. at 1204.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Kansas v. U.S., 531 U.S. 1035 (2000).
235. Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to Pre-
emption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2004).
236. Graham, supra note 180, at 307.
237. See Chemerinsky, supra note 235, at 1324-25.
238. Id. at 1324.
239. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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terrorism, there has been an enhanced focus on immigration enforce-
ment. Faced with an undocumented population approaching ten mil-
lion, state interest in an expansion of local and state enforcement of
immigration law has grown. 240
The current trend toward empowering or requiring state and local
police to enforce immigration law raises a number of concerns involv-
ing policy, efficacy, and constitutionality. Broad enforcement activity
by local and state police creates a real danger of effectively cutting off
entire immigrant communities from police protection service. The po-
tential discriminatory impact of the denial of police protection raises
the question of whether this enforcement activity will violate the
Equal Protection Clause. Undocumented and documented aliens are
protected by the Equal Protection Clause. Although the exact level of
protection is ambiguous, the Court will likely apply some level of
heightened scrutiny. An enforcement policy that has a strong limiting
effect on access to government services as fundamental as police pro-
tection on the basis of alienage would violate the Equal Protection
Clause.
In addition, the CLEAR Act and the HSEA raise significant policy
concerns and will likely isolate and alienate entire communities. The
legislation may strain foreign relations and raise international law con-
cerns. The legislation also raises constitutional concerns of uniformity
of enforcement and moves away from our tradition of federalism. Ex-
perience has shown that enforcement measures alone are wholly un-
successful at controlling who enters and remains in the United States.
Congress should refrain from enacting such damaging legislation and
focus on creating broader immigration reform that will allow the
United States to control its borders, provide for its security, and pro-
tect the constitutional rights of all its residents, both citizens and
noncitizens.
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